Fix GetObjectId bounds in PKCS12 ContentInfo parsing

Bound GetObjectId() by the ContentInfo SEQUENCE end
(curIdx + curSz) instead of the full buffer size. This
prevents the OID TLV from being parsed past the SEQUENCE
boundary in the first place, complementing the post-check
added in PR wolfSSL#10018.

Previously, GetObjectId received (word32)size as maxIdx,
allowing it to read OID data beyond the ContentInfo SEQUENCE.
The post-check then caught this after the fact. With this
change, GetObjectId itself rejects an OID that would exceed
the SEQUENCE, so the over-read never occurs.

Author: TristanInSec

wolfcrypt/src/pkcs12.c

@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int GetSafeContent(WC_PKCS12* pkcs12, const byte* input,
 
             curIdx = localIdx;
             if ((ret = GetObjectId(input, &localIdx, &oid, oidIgnoreType,
-                                                           (word32)size)) < 0) {
+                                       curIdx + (word32)curSz)) < 0) {
                 WOLFSSL_LEAVE("Get object id failed", ret);
                 freeSafe(safe, pkcs12->heap);
                 return ret;