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$_SESSION data leakage between requests in Worker Mode

High
dunglas published GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp Feb 12, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/dunglas/frankenphp (Go)

Affected versions

<1.11.2

Patched versions

1.11.2

Description

Summary

When running FrankenPHP in worker mode, the $_SESSION superglobal is not correctly reset between requests. This allows a subsequent request processed by the same worker to access the $_SESSION data of the previous request (potentially belonging to a different user) before session_start() is called.

Details

In standard PHP execution, the environment is torn down completely after every request. In FrankenPHP's worker mode, the application stays in memory, and superglobals are manually reset between requests.

The vulnerability exists because $_SESSION is stored in the Zend Engine's symbol table (EG(symbol_table)). While the standard PHP request shutdown (RSHUTDOWN) decrements the reference count of the session data, it does not remove the $_SESSION variable itself from the symbol table. FrankenPHP's reset logic (frankenphp_reset_super_globals) previously cleared other superglobals but failed to explicitly delete $_SESSION.

Consequently, until session_start() is called in the new request (which re-initializes the variable), the $_SESSION array retains the data from the previous request processed by that specific worker thread.

Impact

This is a cross-request data leakage vulnerability.

  • Confidentiality: If an application reads $_SESSION before calling session_start(), it can access sensitive information (authentication tokens, user IDs, PII) belonging to the previous user.
  • Logic Errors / Impersonation: If application logic relies on $_SESSION being empty or unset to detect a "guest" state, or checks for specific keys in $_SESSION prior to session initialization, a malicious actor (or accidental race condition) could trigger privilege escalation or user impersonation.

This affects only users running FrankenPHP in worker mode and not session_start() for each request, which is done by default by most frameworks.

PoC

The following steps demonstrate the issue (derived from the regression tests added in the fix):

  1. Client A sends a request that starts a session and sets sensitive data:
// Request 1
session_start();
$_SESSION['secret'] = 'AliceData';
session_write_close();
  1. Client B (or the same client without cookies) sends a request to the same worker. This script checks $_SESSION without starting a session:
// Request 2
// session_start() is NOT called
if (!empty($_SESSION)) {
    echo "Leaked Data: " . $_SESSION['secret'];
}
  1. Result: Client B receives "Leaked Data: AliceData".

Workarounds

  • Ensure session_start() is called immediately at the entry point of your worker script to overwrite any residual data (though this may not cover all edge cases if middleware runs before the controller).
  • Manually unset $_SESSION at the very beginning of the worker loop, before handling the request.

Severity

High

CVE ID

CVE-2026-24894

Weaknesses

Improper Privilege Management

The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor. Learn more on MITRE.

Session Fixation

Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions. Learn more on MITRE.

Insufficient Session Expiration

According to WASC, Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits