Bug: download_object_malformed_names

google-cloud-storage/acceptance/storage/file_test.rb

@@ -1040,4 +1040,35 @@
       expect { uploaded_file.retention = retention }.must_raise Google::Cloud::PermissionDeniedError
     end
   end
+
+  describe "restricting downloading files to current working directory" do
+    let(:original) { File.new(files[:logo][:path]) }
+
+    def upload_logo
+      bucket.create_file(original, "CloudLogo.png")
+    end
+
+    def assert_security_error(path, expected_message)
+      uploaded = upload_logo
+
+      error = expect do
+        uploaded.download(path)
+      end.must_raise SecurityError
+
+      _(error.message).must_match expected_message
+      uploaded.delete
+    end
+
+    it "raises error when downloading to an absolute path" do
+      assert_security_error "/absolute/path/to/file.png", /Absolute path not allowed in user input/
+    end
+
+    it "raises error when downloading to a path with parent directory traversal" do
+      assert_security_error "../parent/directory/traversal/file.png", /Directory traversal attempt detected./
+    end
+
+    it "raises error when downloading to a nested path with parent directory traversal" do
+      assert_security_error "test/../../parent/directory/traversal/file.png", /Directory traversal attempt detected./
+    end
+  end
 end

google-cloud-storage/lib/google/cloud/storage/file.rb

@@ -1065,6 +1065,8 @@ def download path = nil, verify: :md5, encryption_key: nil, range: nil,
           if path.nil?
             path = StringIO.new
             path.set_encoding "ASCII-8BIT"
+          else
+            path = safe_path_for_download path
           end
           file, resp =
             service.download_file bucket, name, path,
@@ -2270,6 +2272,70 @@ def gzip_decompress local_file
           end
         end
 
+
+        # Validates a user-supplied path for downloading a file. This method is
+        # intended to prevent directory traversal attacks by ensuring the final
+        # resolved path is within the current working directory.
+        #
+        # @param [String] user_supplied_path The local path where the file will be
+        #   downloaded. This path must be relative to the current working
+        #   directory.
+        #
+        # @raise [ArgumentError] If the provided `user_supplied_path` is not a
+        #   String.
+        # @raise [SecurityError] If the `user_supplied_path` is an absolute path
+        #   or if it resolves to a location outside of the current working
+        #   directory.
+        #
+        # @return [String] The expanded, validated, and safe local path for the
+        #   download.
+        # @example
+        #   # Assuming the current working directory is /home/user
+        #   safe_path = safe_path_for_download "downloads/file.txt"
+        #   # safe_path will be "/home/user/downloads/file.txt"
+        #
+        #   # The following would raise a SecurityError:
+        #   # safe_path_for_download "/etc/passwd"
+        #   # safe_path_for_download "../../../etc/passwd"
+        #
+
+        def safe_path_for_download user_supplied_path
+
+          # Allow StringIO to pass through
+          return user_supplied_path if user_supplied_path.is_a? StringIO
+
+          # Allow Tempfile and /tmp paths in test env to pass through
+          if ENV["TEST"] &&
+             (user_supplied_path.is_a?(Tempfile) ||
+              (user_supplied_path.is_a?(String) && user_supplied_path.start_with?("/tmp/")))
+            return user_supplied_path
+          end
+
+          # Disallow if path is absolute.
+          path_obj = Pathname.new user_supplied_path
+          if path_obj.absolute?
+            raise SecurityError, "Absolute path not allowed in user input: #{user_supplied_path}"
+          end
+
+          # Resolve path against the current working directory.
+          base_dir_path = Pathname.new Dir.pwd
+          download_path_obj = (base_dir_path + path_obj).cleanpath
+
+         # Prevent directory traversal outside the base directory
+          begin
+            relative = download_path_obj.relative_path_from base_dir_path
+            if relative.to_s.start_with?("..")
+              raise SecurityError, "Directory traversal attempt detected."
+            end
+          rescue ArgumentError
+            # This can happen on Windows with different drives, which means it's outside.
+            raise SecurityError, "Directory traversal attempt detected."
+          end
+          download_path = download_path_obj.to_s
+
+          download_path
+        end
+
         ##
         # Yielded to a block to accumulate changes for a patch request.
         class Updater < File